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FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9419
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/USDOJ WASHDC PRIORITY
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 08 TOKYO 000305

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FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR;
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [OIIP](#) [KMDR](#) [KPAO](#) [PGOV](#) [PINR](#) [ECON](#) [ELAB](#) [JA](#)

SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 02/16/10

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- (1) The fiction of "non-introduction of nuclear weapons"

SANKEI (Pages 1, 8) (Full)
February 15, 2010

Yoshihisa Komori in Washington

The Japan-U.S. alliance is in flux. While the drifting of the new administration in Japan appears to be the cause, there has also been a subtle change in the U.S. position from past administrations. This year marks the 50th anniversary of the revision of the Japan-U.S. security treaty, which is the basis of the bilateral alliance, or the signing of the treaty in its present form. Since alliances cannot remain unchanged forever, it is quite natural for changes and reviews to take place. Yet what benefits have the alliance brought

to the two countries in the first place? It is impossible to project into the future without examining the past and the present. This reporter would like to review the Japan-U.S. alliance based on his long involvement with actual developments in the bilateral relationship.

"I think it is now time for the Japanese people, as well as the Japanese government, to admit this fact frankly."

Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer made the above statement emphatically several times when he revealed the fiction about the U.S.'s "non-introduction of nuclear weapons" into Japan.

In May 1981, I interviewed Reischauer at his home in the suburbs of Boston. During the conversation on Japan-U.S. security that lasted for two hours, he clearly stated in response to my questions that despite the Japanese government's three non-nuclear principles of "not possessing, producing, or introducing" nuclear weapons, for many years, U.S. naval vessels with nuclear arms on board had actually passed through Japanese territorial sea and called on Japanese ports.

I was then a Mainichi Shimbun reporter who was sent to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace as a senior research fellow and was doing research on issues relating to the Japan-U.S. alliance.

The Reischauer residence was the picture of serenity in the bright May sun. A black dog was running in the yard, and Mrs. Haru Reischauer was cradling a relative's baby in her arms in the living room.

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Reischauer, who had just retired from Harvard University, made serious statements in a soft tone in that cozy environment.

He said: "The U.S. side's understanding was that the introduction of nuclear weapons, which the Japanese side translated as *mochikomi*, meant putting nuclear weapons ashore or installing them. Carrying them aboard ships was not included. However, the Japanese government adopted the interpretation that the passage of vessels with nuclear arms aboard through Japanese waters was also included and asserted that the U.S. forces' nuclear weapons had never passed through its territorial seas or been brought into its ports."

The acceptance of this difference in interpretation became a secret agreement between the two countries, and Reischauer said that the Japanese government was fully aware of this.

However, why did Reischauer, fully aware he could expect strong criticism from both governments, reveal this "secret" at that time? Looking back, I think the main reason was he was enraged and thought that "the lies should stop." For sure, Reischauer did not use such rude language, but he did say: "This would mean that the Japanese government is lying to its people."

While Reischauer indicated his understanding of the Japanese people's rejection of nuclear weapons due to their experience with the atomic bombings, he also pointed out the fact that under the bilateral alliance, Japan relies on the U.S. nuclear deterrence through the "nuclear umbrella" for its security. He further asserted that accepting nuclear deterrence while maintaining the fiction of "non-introduction" of nuclear arms under the three non-nuclear principles was very self-contradictory and hypocritical. In the first place, unlike today, the Soviet Union was building up its nuclear capability in its confrontation with the U.S. and areas around Japan were saturated with Soviet nuclear arms at that time.

However, Reischauer's prediction and hope that the Japanese people and government would drop the fiction and admit the fact never came to pass. Although a series of opinion polls showed that the majority of the people believed Reischauer's words, the government consistently said this was not true. Its position has remained unchanged for nearly 30 years.

At present, under the new Hatoyama administration of the Democratic

Party of Japan, an official process to reveal the truth about the Japan-U.S. "secret agreements," including the one disclosed by Reischauer, has been launched. This effort to rectify an abnormal situation in which national defense and security is built on lies seems to have come too late. For us, who have consistently advocated dropping the fiction ever since the Mainichi Shimbun prominently reported on Reischauer's statements, this is a very welcome development.

However, what is the Hatoyama administration planning to do after disclosing the truth about the Japan-U.S. "secret agreements" and proving that Reischauer's statements were true? Will it maintain the position of previous Japanese governments on the "introduction" of nuclear weapons and ban U.S. military vessels carrying nuclear arms from passing through Japanese waters and calling on Japanese ports? Or will it accept the longstanding interpretation of the U.S. side, allow passage and port calls, and carry on with "2.5 non-nuclear principles"?

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U.S. forces have stopped carrying tactical nuclear weapons on aircraft carriers and cruisers as revealed by Reischauer after the communist regime collapsed in the USSR in 1991. Therefore, there is an opinion that the "introduction" of nuclear arms is no longer an issue. However, it is unpredictable how the nuclear situation in areas near Japan will change in the future. It is extremely self-contradictory for Japan to ban even the passage of nuclear weapons through its territorial waters as long as the U.S.'s nuclear deterrence is a component of Japan's national defense.

(2) Government agonizing over Hague Convention concerning child custody after failed international marriages; Japan under growing pressure from U.S. and European countries to accede to convention

NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
February 14, 2010

The issue of parental child abductions after international marriages end in divorce is emerging as a new source of conflict between Japan, the United States, and European countries. The United States and European countries are urging Japan to swiftly accede to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, which stipulates a set of rules for settling disputes. In reality, it is difficult for Japan to accede to the convention due to the need to take necessary legislative measures, the differences in views on families, and other factors. Japan is under growing pressure from other countries. The matter might escalate into a major diplomatic issue.

International marriages have been on the rise in recent years, and there have been numerous cases in which children are taken to Japan after marriages end in divorce, making it extremely difficult for other parents to see their children. In many cases, victims have asked their governments for solutions and their governments in turn have pressed Tokyo to take adequate measures.

British Foreign Secretary David Miliband had a telephone conversation with Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada on Feb. 10 during which Miliband asked for Japan's cooperation, saying: "We attach importance to the issue of parental child abduction. We ask for your continued cooperation for resolving this problem." Meanwhile, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell, who visited Japan for talks on the Japan-U.S. alliance, said emphatically during a press conference on Feb. 2: "(The issue of child abduction) might escalate into a major concern between Japan and the United States."

Eighty-one countries are signatories to the Hague Convention. The convention requires the country to which a child is taken to return the child to the country of his or her habitual residence if such a request is received from the parent from whom the child has been taken. The United States and European countries are calling for the cooperation of the Japanese government in resolving child abduction cases, while pressuring it to swiftly accede to The Hague Convention, saying that if Japan remains outside the convention, similar cases will continue to occur.

The government, led by the Foreign Ministry and Justice Ministry, has been discussing measures to deal with this situation. The Foreign Ministry held a briefing on Feb 10 that brought together the representatives of 13 embassies in Tokyo, in addition to setting up forums for discussions with the U.S. and French embassies.

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Procedures for returning a child require legislative measures. Given the situation that child custody is normally awarded to mothers in Japan, there are major obstacles to acceding to the convention.

"In English, the words used for the act (of removing a child) are 'child abduction,'" a senior Foreign Ministry official said. "Japan is likely to come under greater pressure from the United States and European countries."

(3) Reasons for Ozawa's obsession about visit to U.S.

NIKKEI (Page 2) (Slightly abridged)
February 14, 2010

Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa will likely visit the U.S. during the Golden Week holidays from late April to meet influential U.S. government officials. Ozawa, who is critical of the foreign policy of the previous governments led by the Liberal Democratic Party as blindly following the U.S., has not visited Washington in recent years, although he has visited the U.S. for grass-roots exchanges.

Why has Ozawa been obsessive about visiting the U.S.? When Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell met with Ozawa on Feb. 2, he asked him to visit the U.S. Initially, a meeting with Ozawa was not included in Campbell's itinerary, but the meeting was suddenly arranged as Ozawa agreed to meet him.

This is not the first plan for Ozawa to visit the U.S. since the Obama administration was launched in January of last year.

According to DPJ Diet Affairs Committee Chairman Kenji Yamaoka, the party under the lead of Ozawa last spring made this request to the U.S. government: "The party will seize the reins of government without fail, so Mr. Ozawa will visit the U.S. to discuss future Japan-U.S. relations with U.S. government officials. We would like you to arrange an official meeting with Secretary of State Clinton and an unofficial meeting with President Obama."

Yamaoka stated: "There was considerable progress in coordination work, but because a new strain of influenza began to rage throughout the U.S., the plan was not translated into action." Another informed source pointed out: "Since a meeting with President Obama was not arranged, Ozawa dropped the plan."

At the end of last year, too, the government was about to look into a visit to the U.S. by Ozawa again, but no specifics were discussed at that time.

There were such moves in the past, so it is not true to say that the plan of Ozawa's U.S. tour came out of the blue. The U.S. side must be aiming at significantly moving forward the relocation the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station through Ozawa's visit to the U.S.

Meanwhile, Ozawa has openly asserted regarding the presence of U.S. forces in the Far East region: "The U.S. Navy's 7th Fleet should be sufficient," and has called for an equal relationship between Japan and the U.S. This view might have been reflected in his reply to Campbell's invitation: "If I make the trip, I would be put out if President Obama doesn't take sufficient time (to meet with me)." Even so, Ozawa has said that he would not engage in the policymaking process, so it remains uncertain what Ozawa is willing to talk about

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with President Obama.

Many lawmakers in the ruling and opposition camps take this view: "He might be aiming to demonstrate his extensive personnel ties with key figures in the U.S. government and regaining his grip on the party, which has weakened due to his fund-raising scandal." Ozawa probably judges that if he can prove himself a key person amid strained Obama-Hatoyama relations, he will find it easier to contain growing calls for him to step down as party secretary general.

In addition, behind his eagerness for a meeting with President Obama might be his mixed feelings of love and hatred for the U.S.

"In that case, relations with the U.S. will be ruined." In 1990, when the government was mulling a dispatch of Self-Defense Force personnel on the occasion of the Gulf crisis, Ozawa, who was secretary general of the LDP at that time, scolded Foreign Ministry officials who were not positive about dispatching SDF troops. Ozawa, however, gradually came to harbor wariness toward the U.S.

Some point out that he began to be wary of the U.S. when he accompanied then Vice President Shin Kanemaru on his tour of America in 1992. Kanemaru visited North Korea in 1990, and this visit incurred the U.S.'s strong displeasure. The government managed to arrange a meeting between Kanemaru and then President George H. W. Bush (Bush senior), but Washington's treatment of him was cool.

An informed person said: "He was received at an entrance that is not used for guests to the White House and was shown to a room for family members of the President. He was apparently given a cold reception." Some observers see Ozawa's eagerness to hold a meeting with President Obama as mirroring his mixed feelings toward the U.S. based on this past experience.

The DPJ unofficially asked the U.S. last week to send a letter of invitation for an Ozawa-led delegation of DPJ lawmakers. This may seem a trifle, but for Ozawa, who still remembers Washington's inhospitality in 1992, it might be negotiating with the U.S.

(4) Will Ozawa's leadership be undermined? Part 3: First-term lawmakers at a loss

NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
February 7, 2010

It has been said that the Democratic Party of Japan's structure is a uni-polar system led by Secretary General Ichiro Ozawa. However, the situation in the party has begun changing.

Sensitive to local opinions

On Feb. 3, when Ozawa's exemption from indictment by public prosecutors became certain, Masanao Shibahashi, a first-term lawmaker, was asked by one of his supporters at a Setsubun (traditional end of winter) festival held in Gifu City about the problem involving Secretary General Ozawa. "He has been giving explanations in such venues as press conferences," Shibahashi answered. "However, even we don't know what really happened."

Shibahashi is one of the graduates of the Ichiro Ozawa Institute of Politics. However, he flatly said: "I have no intention of defending Mr. Ozawa over this issue. I think most first-term lawmakers are

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taking a neutral stance."

Shibahashi's rival in this single-seat constituency is former Postal Minister Seiko Noda of the Liberal Democratic Party. If the next election is taken into consideration, all 143 first-term lawmakers have no other choice but to be sensitive to the trends in their local constituencies and in public opinion. Tsutomu Takamura, who was defeated by former Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura in the Yamaguchi Constituency No. 1 but later secured a seat in the proportional representation segment, said: "I feel most embarrassed when I come to think that people may suspect we too might be falsifying our political fund reports (because of the incident this time)."

In late January, at a Japanese-style pub near the Diet Building, about 10 first-term DPJ lawmakers, joined by customers, held a discussion. "Both Mr. Ozawa and Mr. (Naoto) Kan may not be in political circles in 10 years' or 20 year's time," said one of the lawmakers. "I must seriously consider whom I should follow." The fate of the so-called Koizumi children is not a matter of indifference to them (nearly all the freshman candidates elected in the 2005 postal election lost their seats in the Lower House election last year).

The Ozawa leadership told the 143 first-term lawmakers: "Your job is to win the next election. The election takes priority over policies"; "There is no need for you to be in Tokyo"; and, "Group activities are prohibited." Their obedience to those orders has now been undermined. They are now beginning to act on their own or hold meetings.

Five first-term lawmakers, who previously worked with investment banks or securities houses, met in a room in the Diet Members' Building. The lawmakers, who call themselves "finance boys," are aiming at proposing such policies as a review of the method of managing the pension reserves before the end of this fiscal year.

Attachment to Ozawa leadership still strong

There is also a group named "Retsu-no Kai." It is a group of first-term lawmakers who have their seats in the same row in the Lower House floor of a plenary session. They circulate a piece of paper during a plenary session to adjust their schedules for a meeting. The group is characterized by their holding meetings at any time without the involvement of secretaries.

Even so, many first-term lawmakers are strongly attached to the Ozawa leadership, because they feel uneasy about their election base. The 143 first-term lawmakers, who occupy nearly half of the Lower House seats, are torn between whether they should go their own way or should follow Ozawa.

(5) National Public Service Law draft amendment: Vice minister and department director general-class officials to be treated equally

NIKKEI (Page 3) (Full)
February 16, 2010

The government is set to submit a bill amending the National Public Service Law to the current session of the Diet. In this connection, it has decided to make changes to the original plan, which divided senior positions into two groups - vice ministers or bureau

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directors and department director general-class officials - and unify the two groups into one. As a result, it will become possible to handle the transferring of a vice minister to a department director general-class position not as a demotion, a personnel change regarded as a special exception, but as a regular transfer. Since a review of the government employees' remuneration law is to be postponed, even if such a transfer is treated as a regular transfer, the transferred official's salary would be cut substantially. As such, some take the view that it would be difficult to put the revised plan into practice.

Referring to the revised bill, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama on the 15th stressed: "Transferring a vice minister to a department director general-class position is not a demotion. The revision is designed to enhance the freedom (of personnel changes)." The prime minister told this to the press corps at the Prime Minister's Official Residence (the Kantei). The government plans to adopt the revised bill at a cabinet meeting as early as the 19th.

According to the existing amendment bill, two cross-sectional lists of candidates were to be drawn up and personnel changes for demotion were to be made within the two groups. Demoting vice ministers or bureau directors general to department director general-level positions is regarded as an exceptional case. To implement such demotions, conditions such as that the work performance of the official in question was substandard had to be met.

The revised plan stipulates that the two lists are to be unified into one and positions of officials from vice ministers down to department director general-level officials are to be regarded as management positions with different grades. Officials in the unified list can be demoted or appointed flexibly.

However, the remuneration law that states remunerations for senior public servants and the National Personnel Authority's regulations will not be reviewed this time. Even if the revised National Public Service Law stipulates that vice ministers and department director generals will be treated equally, their treatment under the remuneration law will be substantially different. If a vice minister is transferred to the position of a department director general, his or her annual income could be lowered by about 8 million yen from about 23 million yen to about 15 million yen.

National government employees can register complaints with the National Personnel Authority if they are demoted against their will. Under the existing law, demotions are unlikely to be approved except for in cases in which their work performance is poor or they have a health problem. Their position is thus guaranteed.

There is a strong possibility that depending on the specifics of the revised bill, even if national government employees file complaints against their transfer (within the same list), which is effectively a demotion, their complaints might not be addressed for the reason that their previous and new positions are both management positions. However, regarding the issue of a substantive drop in annual remunerations, some government officials have pointed out that it would be difficult to implement the revised bill, because it lacks specifics. Even if the revised bill is passed into law during the current Diet session, the government is bound to be pressed to look into amending the remuneration law in the process of drastically reforming the public servant system, including basic labor rights for government workers, slated to occur this fall.

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(6) Publication of Gaiko Forum to be suspended

YOMIURI (Page 35) (Full)
February 16, 2010

It was learned yesterday that the publication of Gaiko Forum, a monthly journal on foreign affairs (Toshi Publishing Company), will be discontinued after the April issue, which will go on sale on March 8. Of a circulation of 30,000, about 9,000 copies are purchased by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). However, as a result of its budget screening, the Government Revitalization Unit decided to discontinue the purchase of the journal. As such, it has become difficult for the company to continue publishing the journal.

Gaiko Forum was first published in 1988. It is the only Japanese monthly foreign policy journal in which Japanese and foreign academics and diplomats publish essays. MOFA has been distributing copies of the foreign policy journal to domestic and foreign experts and others. Following the government's decision to stop purchasing the journal, University of Tokyo Professor Shinichi Kitaoka and other experts on international affairs issued an emergency statement last December opposing the discontinuation.

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